Abstract. A simple game (N, v) is given by a set N of n players and a partition of 2 N into a set L of losing coalitions L with value v(L) = 0 that is closed under taking subsets and a set W of winning coalitions W with v(W ) = 1. Simple games with α = min p≥0 maxW ∈W,L∈L p(L) p(W )
Introduction
Cooperative Game Theory provides a mathematical framework for capturing situations where subsets of agents may form a coalition in order to obtain some collective profit or share some collective cost. Formally, a cooperative game (with transferable utilities) consists of a pair (N, v), where N is a set of n agents called players and v : 2 N → R + is a value function that satisfies v(∅) = 0. In our context, the value v(S) of a coalition S ⊆ N represents the profit for S if all players in S choose to collaborate with (only) each other. The central problem in cooperative game theory is to allocate the total profit v(N ) of the grand coalition N to the individual players i ∈ N in a "fair" way. To this end various solution concepts such as the core, Shapley value or nuclueolus have been designed; see Chapter 9 of [23] for an overview.
In our paper we study simple games [26, 31] . Simple games form a classical class of games, which are well studied; see also the book of Taylor and Zwicker [29] . 4 The notion of being simple means that every coalition either has some equal amount of power or no power at all. Formally, a cooperative game (N, v) is simple if v is a monotone 0-1 function with v(∅) = 0 and v(N ) = 1, so v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for all S ⊆ N and v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . In other words, if v is simple, then there is a set W ⊆ 2 N of winning coalitions W that have value v(W ) = 1 and a set L ⊆ 2 N of losing coalitions L that have value v(L) = 0. Note that N ∈ W, ∅ ∈ L and W ∪ L = 2 N . The monotonicity of v implies that subsets of losing coalitions are losing and supersets of winning coalitions are winning. A winning coalition W is minimal if every proper subset of W is losing, and a losing coalition L is maximal if every proper superset of L is winning.
A simple game is a weighted voting game if there exists a payoff vector p ∈ R n + such that a coalition S is winning if p(S) ≥ 1 and losing if p(S) < 1. Weighted voting games are also known as weighted majority games and form one of the most popular classes of simple games. Due to their practical applications in voting systems, computer operating systems and model resource allocation (see e.g. [2, 6] ), structural and computational complexity aspects for solution concepts for weighted voting games have been thoroughly investigated [8, 9, 12, 15] . However, it is easy to construct simple games that are not weighted voting games. We give an example below, but in fact there are many important simple games that are not weighted voting games, and the relationship between weighted voting games and simple games is not yet fully understood. Therefore, Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko [15] introduced a parameter α, called the critical threshold value, to measure the "distance" of a simple game to the class of weighted voting games:
where the maximum is taken over all winning coalitions in W and all losing coalitions in L. A simple game (N, v) is a weighted voting game if and only if α < 1. 5 This follows from observing that each optimal solution p of (1) can be scaled to satisfy p(W ) ≥ 1 for all winning coalitions W .
A concrete example of a simple game (N, v) that is not a weighted voting game and that has in fact a large value of α was given in [11] . Let N = {1, . . . , n} for some even integer n ≥ 4, and let the minimal winning coalitions be the pairs {1, 2}, {2, 3}, . . . {n− 1, n}, {n, 1}. Consider any payoff p ≥ 0 satisfying p(W ) ≥ 1 for every winning coalition W . Then p i + p i+1 ≥ 1 for i = 1, . . . , n (where n + 1 = 1). This means that p(N ) ≥ n. Due to this somewhat extreme example, the authors of [11] conjectured that α ≤ 1 4 n for all simple games. This conjecture turns out to be an interesting combinatorial problem. Conjecture 1 [11] . For every simple game (N, v), it holds that α ≤ 1 4 n.
Our Results
In Section 2 we prove that Conjecture 1 holds for the case where all minimal winning coalitions have size 3 and for its complementary case where no minimal winning collection has size 3. We were not able to prove Conjecture 1 for all simple games. However, in Section 3 we show that α ≤ 2 7 n ≈ 0.2858n for every simple game. In Section 4 we consider a subclass of simple games based on a natural desirability order [24] . A simple game (N, v) is complete if the players can be ordered by a complete, transitive ordering , say, 1 2 · · · n, indicating that higher ranked players have more power (and are more desirable) than lower ranked players. More precisely, i j means that v(S ∪ {i}) ≥ v(S ∪ {j}) for any coalition S ⊆ N \{i, j}. The class of complete simple games properly contains all weighted voting games [13] . For complete simple games, we show a lower bound on α that is asymptotically lower than 1 4 n, namely α = O( √ n ln n). This bound matches, up to a ln n factor, the lower bound of [11] (conjectured to be tight in [11] ). 5 If α ≤ 1, we speak of roughly weighted voting games [29] .
In Section 5 we discuss some algorithmic and complexity issues. We focus on instances where all minimal winning coalitions have size 2. We say that such simple games are graphic, as they can conveniently be described by a graph G = (N, E) with vertex set N and edge set E = {ij | {i, j} is winning}. For graphic simple games we show that computing α is NP-hard in general (see below for some related results). On the positive side, we show that computing α is polynomial-time solvable if the underlying graph G = (N, E) is bipartite, or if α is known to be small (less than a fixed number a). We conclude with some remarks and open problems in Section 6.
Related Work
Another way to measure the distance of a simple game to the class of weighted voting games is to use the dimension of a simple game [28] , which is the smallest number of weighted voting games whose intersection equals a given simple game. However, computing the dimension of a simple game is NP-hard [7] , and the largest dimension of a simple game with n players is 2 n−o(n) [20] . Moreover, simple games with dimension 1 have α = 1, but α may be arbitrarily large for simple games with dimension larger than 1.
6 Hence there is no direct relation between the two distance measures. We also note that Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko [15] introduced two other distance parameters. One measures the power balance between small and large coalitions. The other one allows multiple thresholds instead of threshold 1 only. See [15] for further details.
For graphic simple games, it is natural to take the number of players n as the input size for answering complexity questions, but in general simple games may have different representations. For instance, one can list all minimal winning coalitions or all maximal losing coalitions. Under these two representations the problem of deciding if α < 1, that is, if a given simple game is a weighted voting game, is also polynomialtime solvable. This follows from results of Hegedüs and Megiddo [16] and Peled and Simeone [22] , as shown by Freixas, Molinero, Olsen and Serna [12] . The latter authors also showed that the same result holds if the representation is given by listing all winning coalitions or all losing coalitions. Moreover, they gave a number of complexity results of recognizing other subclasses of simple games.
We also note a similarity of our research with research into matching games. In Section 2 we show that a crucial case in our study is when the simple game is graphic, that is, defined on some graph G = (N, E). In the corresponding matching game a coalition S ⊆ N has value v(S) equal to the maximum size of a matching in the subgraph of G induced by S. One of the most prominent solution concepts is the core of a game, defined by core(N, v) :
A core allocation is stable, as no coalition has any incentive to object against it. However, the core may be empty. Matching games are not simple games. Yet their core constraints are readily seen to simplify to p ≥ 0 and p i + p j ≥ 1 for all ij ∈ E. Classical solution concepts, such as the core and core-related ones like least core, nucleolus or nucleon are well studied for matching games, see, for example, [3, 4, 10, 18, 19, 27] . However, the problems encountered there differ with respect to the objective function. For graphic simple games we aim to bound p(L) over all losing coalitions, subject to p ≥ 0, p i + p j ≥ 1 for all ij ∈ E, whereas for matching games with an empty core we wish to bound p(N ), subject to p ≥ 0, p i + p j ≥ 1 for all ij ∈ E. Nevertheless, basic tools from matching theory like the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition play a role in both cases. 6 A simple game with 1 2 n players of type A and 1 2 n players of type B and minimal winning coalitions consisting of one player of each type has dimension 2 and α = 1 4 n.
Two Complementary Cases
In this section we will consider the following two "complementary" cases: when all winning coalitions have size equal to 3 (Section 2.1), and when no winning coalition has size equal to 3 (Section 2.2). First observe that winning coalitions of size 1 do not cause any problems. If {i} is a winning coalition of size 1, we satisfy it by setting p i = 1. Since no losing coalition L contains i, we may remove i from the game and solve (1) with respect to the resulting subgame. A similar argument applies if some i ∈ N is not contained in any minimal winning coalition. We then simply define p i = 0 and remove i from the game. Thus, we may assume without loss of generality that all minimal winning coalitions have size at least 2 and that they cover all of N .
All Minimal Winning Coalitions Have Size 2.
We first investigate the case where all minimal winning coalitions have size exactly 2. This case (which is a crucial case in our study) can conveniently be translated to a graph-theoretic problem. Let G = (N, E) be the graph with vertex set N whose edges are exactly the minimal winning coalitions of size 2 in our game (N, v). Our assumption that N is completely covered by minimal winning coalitions means that G has no isolated vertices. Losing coalitions correspond to independent sets of vertices L ⊆ N . Then the min max problem (1) becomes
where the minimum is taken over all feasible pay-off vectors p, that is, p ∈ R n + with p i + p j ≥ 1 for every ij ∈ E, and the maximum is taken over all independent sets L ⊆ N .
We first consider the case where G = (A ∪ B, E) is bipartite. To explain the basic idea, we introduce the following concept (illustrated in Figure 1 ). Definition. Let G = (A ∪ B, E) be a bipartite graph of order n = |A| + |B| without isolated notes and assume without loss of generality that |A| ≤ |B|. Let λ ≤ 1 2 such that |A| = λn (and |B| = (1 − λ)n). We say that G is well-spread with parameter λ if for all S ⊆ A we have
(Here, as usual, N (S) ⊆ B denotes the set of neighbors of S in B.) Examples of well-spread bipartite graphs are biregular graphs or biregular graphs minus an edge. Note that if G is well-spread with parameter λ ≤ 1 2 , then Hall's condition |N (S)| ≥ |S| for all S ⊆ A is satisfied, implying that A can be completely matched to B (see, for example, [21] ). The following lemma is the key observation.
Hence we have proven the lemma.
⊓ ⊔
In general, when G = (A ∪ B, E) is not well-spread, we seek to decompose G into well-spread induced subgraphs G i = (A i ∪ B i , E i ) with A = A i and B = B i . Of course, this can only work if G = (A ∪ B, E) is such that A can be matched to B in G. Proposition 1. Let G = (A ∪ B, E) be a bipartite graph without isolated vertices and assume that A can be matched into B. Then G decomposes into well-spread induced subgraphs G i = (A i ∪ B i , E i ), with A = A i and B = B i in such a way that for all i, j with i < j, λ i ≥ λ j and no edges join 
As we will see, the assumption of Proposition 1 is not really restrictive for our purposes. A (connected) component C of a graph G is even (odd) if C has an even (odd) number of vertices. A graph G = (N, E) is factor-critical if for every vertex v ∈ V (G), the graph G − v has a perfect matching. We recall the well-known GallaiEdmonds Theorem (see [21] ) for characterizing the structure of maximum matchings in G; see also Figure 2 . There exists a (unique) subset A ⊆ N , called a Tutte set, such that -every even component of G − A has a perfect matching; -every odd component of G − A is factor-critical; -every maximum matching in G is the union of a perfect matching in each even component, a nearly perfect matching in each odd component and a matching that matches A (completely) to the odd components. We are now ready to derive our first main result. 
It is straightforward to check that p ≥ 0 and p i + p j ≥ 1. Indeed,p ≥ 
|C|.
A similar argument applies to odd components. Let C be an odd component in G − A of size at least 3. Then certainly L cannot contain all vertices of C, so there exists some i ∈ C\L. Since C is factor-critical, C\i is perfectly matchable, implying that L can contain at most half of C\i. Thus |L ∩ C| ≤ (|C| − 1)/2 and p(L ∩ C) ≤ (|C| − 1)/4. Summarizing, n − n 0 = |N | − (|A| + |B|) is the sum over all |C|, where C is an even component plus the sum over all |C| − 1 where C is an odd component, and p(L\L 0 ) is at most a 1 4 fraction of this, finishing the proof.
⊓ ⊔
We like to mention that both decompositions that we use to define the payoff p can be computed efficiently. For the Edmonds-Gallai decomposition, this is a wellknown fact (see, for example, [21] ). For the decomposition into well-spread subgraphs, this follows from the observation that deciding whether max S |S| |N (S)| ≤ r is equivalent to min S r|N (S)| − |S| ≥ 0, which amounts to minimizing the submodular function f (S) = r|N (S)| − |S|; see, for example, [25] for a strongly polynomial-time algorithm or Appendix A.
No Minimal Winning Sets of Size 3
We now deal shortly with the more general case where there are, in addition, minimal winning coalitions of size 4 or larger. First recall how the payoff p that we proposed in Corollary 1 works. For a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E), split into well-spread subgraphs G i = (A i ∪ B i , E i ) with parameter λ i , we let p ≡ λ i on B i . So for λ i < 1 4 , p may be infeasible, that is, we may encounter winning coalitions W of size 4 or larger with p(W ) < 1. This problem can easily be remedied by raising p a bit on each B i and decreasing it accordingly on A i . Indeed, the standard (λ, 1 − λ) allocation rule proposed in Lemma 1 is based on the simple fact that λ(1 − λ) ≤ 1 4 , which gives us some flexibility for modification in the case where λ is small. More precisely, defining the payoff to be p :≡ A ∪ B, E) , well-spread with parameter λ, would work as well and thus solve the problem. Indeed, the unique independent set L that maximizes p(L) is L = B in this case, which gives p(L) = p(B) = |B|/(4(1 − λ)) = 1 4 n. There is one thing that needs to be taken care of. Namely, in Proposition 1 we assumed that G = (A ∪ B, E) has no isolated vertices, an assumption that can be made without loss of generality if we only have 2-element winning coalitions. Now we may have isolated vertices that are part of winning coalitions of size 4 or larger. But this does not cause any problems either. We simply assign p := 1 4 to these isolated vertices to ensure that indeed all winning coalitions W have p(W ) ≥ 1. Formally, this can also be seen as an extension of our decomposition: if G = (A ∪ B, E) contains isolated vertices, then they are all contained in B (once we assume that A can be completely matched into B). So the set of isolated vertices can be seen as a "degenerate" wellspread final subgraph (A k ∪ B k , E k ) with A k = ∅ and parameter λ k = 0. Our proposed payoff p ≡ 
⊓ ⊔
We note that Proposition 2 is a pure existence result. To computep it requires to solve a maximum independent set problem in 3-uniform hypergraphs, which is NPhard. This can be seen from a reduction from the maximum independent set problem in graphs, which is well known to be NP-hard (see [14] ). Given a graph G = (V, E), construct a 3-uniform hypergraphḠ as follows. Add n = |V | new vertices labeled 1, . . . , n and extend each edge e = ij ∈ E to n edges {i, j, 1}, . . . , {i, j, n} inḠ. It is readily seen that a maximum independent set of vertices inḠ (that is, a set of vertices that does not contain any hyperedge) consists of the n new vertices plus a maximum independent set in G.
Minimal Winning Coalitions of Arbitrary Size
In this section we try to combine the ideas for the two complementary cases to derive an upper bound α ≤ 2 7 for the general case. The payoffs p that we consider will all satisfy p ≥ 1 4 so that only winning coalitions of size 2 and 3 are of interest. The basic idea is to start with a bipartite graph (A ∪ B, E) representing the size 2 winning coalitions and a payoff satisfying all these. Standard payoffs that we use satisfy p ≥ 1 4 on B and p ≥ 1 2 on A. Hence we have to worry only about 3-element winning coalitions contained in B. We seek to satisfy these by raising the payoff of some vertices in B without spending too much in total.
More precisely, consider a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) representing the winning coalitions of size 2. As before, we assume that A can be completely matched into B, so that our decomposition into well-spread subgraphs
LetL be a losing coalition with maximump(L). We define an alternative payoffp as follows:
Clearly, bothp andp are feasible. We claim that a suitable combination of these two yields the desired upper bound.
Proof. LetL as above be a losing coalition with maximump-value. Let
we then get (using well-spreadedness)p
For λ i ≥ 1 4 , the alternative payoffp equalsp on A i ∪B i except that vertices in B i \L are raised to
because, by definition ofp, exactly
where we have used 1 −λ i ≤ .
Thus,
Now the claim follows by observing that
. ⊓ ⊔ Hence we obtained the following theorem. 
Complete Simple Games
Recall that a simple game (N, v) is complete if for a suitable ordering, say, 1 2 · · · n indicating that i is more powerful than i + 1 in the sense that v(S ∪ {i}) ≥ v(S ∪ {i + 1}) for any coalition S ⊆ N \{i, j}. Intuitively, the class of complete simple games is "closer" to weighted voting games than general simple games. The next result quantifies this expectation. Proof. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players and assume without loss of generality that 1 2 · · · n. Let k ∈ N be the largest number such that {k, . . . , n} is winning. For i = 1, . . . , k, let s i denote the smallest size of a winning coalition in {i, . . . , n}. Define p i := 1/s i for i = 1, . . . , k and p i := p k for i = k + 1, . . . , n. Thus, obviously,
Consider a winning coalition W ⊆ N and let i be the first player in W (with respect to ). If |W | ≤ √ n, then s i ≤ |W | ≤ √ n and hence p(W )
The optimal solution of this maximization problem is easily seen to be
Summarizing, we obtain p(L)/p(W ) ≤ √ n ln n, as claimed. ⊓ ⊔
In [11] it is conjectured that α = O( √ n) holds for complete simple games. We direct the reader to [11] for further details, including a lower bound of order √ n as well as specific subclasses of complete simple games for which α = O( √ n) can be proven.
Algorithmic Aspects
A fundamental question concerns the complexity of our original problem (1). For general simple games this depends on how the game in question is given, and we refer to Section 1 for a discussion. Here we concentrate on the "graphic" case where the minimal winning coalitions are given as the edges of a graph G.
Proposition 3. For a bipartite graph G = (N, E) we can compute α G in polynomial time.
Proof. Let P ⊆ R n denote the set of feasible payoffs (satisfying p ≥ 0 and p i + p j ≥ 1 for ij ∈ E). For α ∈ R we let
Thus α G = min{α | P α = ∅}. The separation problem for P α (for any given α) is efficiently solvable. Given p ∈ R n , we can check feasibility and we can check whether max{p(L) | L ⊆ N independent} ≤ α by solving a corresponding maximum weight independent set problem in the bipartite graph G. Thus we can, for any given α ∈ R, apply the ellipsoid method to either compute some p ∈ P α or conclude that P α = ∅. Binary search then exhibits the minimum value for which P α is non-empty. Note that binary search works indeed in polynomial time since the optimal α has size polynomially bounded in n. The latter follows by observing that
can be computed by solving a linear system of n constraints defining an optimal basic solution of the above linear program.
⊓ ⊔
The above proof also applies to all other classes of graphs, such as claw-free graphs and generalizations thereof (see [5] ) in which finding a weighted maximum independent set is polynomial-time solvable. In general, however, computing α is NP-hard (just like computing a maximum independent set).
Proposition 4.
Computing α G for arbitrary graphs G is NP-hard.
Proof. Given G = (N, E) with maximum independent set of size k, let G ′ = (N ′ , E ′ ) and G ′′ = (N ′′ , E ′′ ) be two disjoint copies of G. For each i ′ ∈ N ′ and j ′′ ∈ N ′′ we add an edge i ′ j ′′ if and only if i = j or ij ∈ E and call the resulting graph G * = (N * , E * ). (In graph theoretic terminology G * is also known as the strong product of G with P 2 .) We claim that α G * = k/2 (thus showing that computing α G * is as difficult as computing k).
First note that the independent sets in G * are exactly the sets
. Hence, p ≡ 1 2 on N * yields max p(L * ) = k/2 where the maximum is taken over all independent sets L * ⊆ N * in G * . This shows that α G * ≤ k/2.
Conversely, let p * be any feasible payoff in G * (that is, p * ≥ 0 and p * i + p * j ≥ 1 for all ij ∈ E * ). Let L ⊆ N be a maximum independent set of size k in G and construct L * by including for each i ∈ L either i ′ or i ′′ in L * , whichever has p-value at least 1 2 . Then, by construction, L * is an independent set in G * with p * (L * ) ≥ k/2, showing that α G * ≥ k/2. ⊓ ⊔ Summarizing, for graphic simple games, computing α G is as least as hard as computing the size of a maximum independent in G. For our last result we assume that a is a fixed integer, that is, a is not part of the input.
Proposition 5. For every fixed a > 0, it is possible to decide if α G ≤ a in polynomial time for an arbitrary graph G = (N, E).
Proof. Let k = 2⌈a + ǫ⌉ for some ǫ > 0. By brute-force, we can check in O(n 2k ) time if N contains 2k vertices {u 1 , . . . , u k } ∪ {v 1 , . . . , v k } that induce k disjoint copies of P 2 , that is, paths P i = u i v i of length 2 for i = 1, . . . , k with no edges joining any two of these paths. If so, then the condition p(u i ) + p(v i ) ≥ 1 implies that one of u i , v i , say u i , must receive a payoff p(u i ) ≥ 1 2 , and hence U = {u 1 , . . . , u k } has p(U ) ≥ k/2 > a. As U is an independent set, we conclude that α(G) > a. Now assume that G does not contain k disjoint copies of P 2 as an induced subgraph, that is, G is kP 2 -free. For every s ≥ 1, the number of maximal independent sets in a sP 2 -free graphs is n O(s) due to a result of Balas and Yu [1] . Tsukiyama, Ide, Ariyoshi, and Shirakawa [30] show how to enumerate all maximal independent sets of a graph G on n vertices and m edges using time O(nm) per independent set. Hence we can find all maximal independent sets of G and thus solve, in polynomial time, the linear program 10. Then it remains to check if the solution found satisfies α ≤ a.
Conclusions
The two main open problems are to prove the upper bound of 
